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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No.  13-4053 
___________ 
 
DAVID STETSER, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SHERRY JINKS, Individ. & in her official capacity as a Police Officer in the Gloucester 
Township Police Department; GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP; GLOUCESTER 
TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT; W. HARRY EARL, Chief of Police of 
Gloucester Township Police Department, Individually and in His official capacity as 
Chief of Police of Gloucester Township Police Department; JOHN DOES 1-10 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-03094) 
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2014 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 10, 2014) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant David Stetser filed a complaint against Officer Sherry Jinks for 
malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment to Officer Jinks, finding as a matter of law she had probable cause to initiate 
the prosecution, and denied Stetser’s motion for reconsideration.  Stetser appeals both 
orders.  We will affirm.1 
I. 
 On October 3, 2007, Stetser and his wife, Jacqueline Stetser, divorced.  Afterward, 
Jacqueline Stetser was granted a temporary restraining order against Stetser, which 
matured into a final restraining order on April 28, 2008.  The restraining order prohibited 
Stetser from having any contact with his ex-wife and from visiting his two children.   
 On August 21, 2008, Jacqueline Stetser entered the police department in 
Gloucester Township, New Jersey, and complained to Officer Jinks that her ex-husband 
violated the restraining order by sending her a text message containing a picture of a 
woman performing fellatio on a man.  Jacqueline Stetser showed Officer Jinks the 
message on her cell phone and signed a statement that she had received the lewd picture 
from her ex-husband and that it was sent to her cell phone number from his cell phone 
number.  Stetser does not dispute that the number from which the picture was sent 
previously belonged to him.  Relying on Jacqueline Stetser’s statement, Officer Jinks 
filed a criminal complaint against Stetser on August 21, 2008.  At that time, Officer Jinks 
was well aware of Jacqueline and David Stetser from their previous contacts with the 
police and complaints they had filed against each other. 
                                              
1 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Our 
jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 The criminal complaint charged Stetser with violating the restraining order and 
harassment.  Stetser claimed he had changed his cell phone number after the final 
restraining order went into effect, and that the number from which his ex-wife received 
the lewd picture no longer belonged to him.  At trial, Stetser presented evidence based on 
cell phone records that he did not send the lewd picture, and the charges were dismissed. 
 Stetser then filed this § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Officer Jinks in 
federal court.  As noted, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer 
Jinks, finding she had probable cause to initiate the criminal prosecution.  This timely 
appeal followed.2 
II. 
 To prevail on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that the 
“proceeding was initiated without probable cause.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 
186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted).  Probable cause exists when “the facts 
and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” 
United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 
442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9 (1979)).  A court determining whether an officer had probable 
cause considers an objective officer’s beliefs rather than the arresting officer’s state of 
mind.  Devenpeck  v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004).  Although the probable cause 
                                              
2 We exercise plenary review of an order granting summary judgment.  Kossler v. 
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Drawing all inferences in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant, Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 2007), we 
may affirm the entry of summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
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inquiry is usually a question for the jury, “where no genuine issue as to any material fact 
exists and where credibility conflicts are absent, summary judgment may be appropriate.”  
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), abrogated on 
other grounds by Curley, 499 F.3d at 209-11. 
 In this case, the District Court found Officer Jinks had probable cause to initiate 
the prosecution.  We agree.  Officer Jinks initiated a criminal proceeding against Stetser 
on the basis of Jacqueline Stetser’s statement that she had received a lewd picture from 
her ex-husband.  As noted, Jacqueline Stetser showed the picture to Officer Jinks and 
signed a statement that the cell phone number from which she received the picture was 
her ex-husband’s number.  Based on this evidence, a reasonable officer would be 
warranted in believing Stetser had violated the restraining order.  See Wilson v. Russo, 
212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting “a positive identification by a victim witness, 
without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause”). 
 Stetser contends his ex-wife was an unreliable witness and Officer Jinks should 
have conducted further investigation before filing the criminal complaint.  Yet an officer 
is “not required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the probable 
cause that, in [her] mind, already exist[s].”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 
782, 790 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because the facts known to her established probable cause, 
Officer Jinks was not required to investigate further.  Moreover, it would have been 
implausible to speculate the message could have been sent by someone other than Stetser.  
As the District Court reasoned, “it would mean that someone, with the same number that 
[Stetser] undisputedly had, randomly sent a lewd photograph to [Stetser’s] former wife.”  
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Stetser v. Jinks, Civil No. 10-3094, 2013 WL 3791613, at *3 (D.N.J. July 19, 2013) 
(emphasis in original).  Accordingly, there was sufficient probable cause to file the 
complaint. 
 Nor does the fact that Officer Jinks observed David and Jacqueline Stetsers’ 
previous disputes at the police department render Jacqueline Stetser an unreliable 
witness.  Although we have stated that “[i]ndependent exculpatory evidence or 
substantial evidence of the witness’s own unreliability . . . could outweigh [a victim’s] 
identification” and thus defeat probable cause, each case must be examined on its facts.  
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790.  In this case, Officer Jinks’s awareness that Jacqueline Stetser 
was willing to file criminal complaints does not erode the finding of probable cause.   
 In sum, we find Officer Jinks had probable cause to initiate the criminal 
prosecution against Stetser.  Officer Jinks is entitled to summary judgment.  Although 
Stetser also appeals the denial of his motion for reconsideration, he advances no 
arguments independent of his challenge to the order granting summary judgment.  
Accordingly, on the grounds stated, we find the motion for reconsideration was correctly 
denied. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders granting 
summary judgment and denying the motion for reconsideration. 
